


AIC2030 GEOECONOMICS REVIEW SERIES

The Sahel

in a Reconfiguring Africa

Geopolitical power, economic interdependence
and strategic choice

FIVE-COUNTRY STUDY



OCTOBER 2026



ABOUT THIS REVIEW / RESEARCH APPROACH

Purpose and approach

Geoeconomics examines how economic relationships and geopolitical power shape one another. [1-4]

THE REVIEW QUESTION

How are changing political and economic relationships reshaping power, interdependence, productive capabilities and strategic choice across the Sahel?

SCOPE AND CASE SELECTION

Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania form a purposive comparison of inland and Atlantic access, institutions and resource-linked relationships. Country cases examine specific services, contracts and operating episodes; they are not representative national profiles or a definition of the entire Sahel.

METHOD / DOCUMENTARY COMPARISON

Compare dated institutional records, statistics, project disclosures and company accounts; map economic chains and reconstruct selected event sequences. Distinguish observations from interpretation, assessment and conditional scenarios. This is a selected-case review, not a causal impact study or independent contract audit.



WORKING PROPOSITION / WHAT WOULD CHALLENGE IT

Reliable access, manageable obligations and productive capability can expand economic agency: the ability to act through viable choices and retain value after costs. Test this proposition against cases with improved conditions but no corresponding gains, allowing for timing, distribution and rival influences.

COMPETING EXPLANATION

Commodity prices, security, rainfall, demand or implementation may explain observed changes more strongly than political realignment or contract terms. The review identifies these rival mechanisms; their relative contribution is not causally estimated.

DATES, BOUNDARIES AND LIMITS

Evidence inclusion cut-off: 26 October 2026; this is not certification of every system's status on that date. Trade shares refer to 2021-23, electricity data to 2024, and cases retain their own dates. Extractive-sector and official/company-source selection limits generalisation; comparable fertilizer evidence is incomplete.

Mauritania provides the Atlantic-access contrast to four inland cases; Senegal and northern Nigeria are relevant comparators beyond this purposive study. Inclusion does not imply representativeness. Sources and limitations: pp31-34; expanded source-scope register accompanies this edition.

READING GUIDE

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Findings, mechanisms, power relations and conditional futures.

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EXECUTIVE GEOECONOMIC FINDINGS / REGIONAL SYNTHESIS

Regional power is relational. National choices cross borders.

Five bounded findings from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania. The region is an interconnected study area, not a single institutional bloc.

01 RESOURCE AUTHORITY RESETS TERMS, NOT WHOLE CHAINS

HIGH / DOCUMENTED INTERVENTIONS

Ownership, fiscal rules and state participation are being renegotiated. Export, operation, finance and sales remain separate interfaces. [48-56]

02 GATEWAYS AND TRANSIT SHAPE INLAND BARGAINING

HIGH / CASE MECHANISMS; OPTIONS UNVERIFIED

Niger-Benin oil loading and inland access to coastal services demonstrate how external operating interfaces condition usable sovereignty. Gateway alternatives must be tested for cost, reliability and permissions. [9-11, 26, 43-45]

03 INSTITUTIONS OVERLAP; THEY DO NOT MOVE TOGETHER

HIGH / INSTITUTIONAL DISTINCTIONS

AES/ECOWAS realignment, WAMU/BCEAO continuity, Chad's BEAC setting and Mauritania's separate monetary arrangements create distinct payment, trade and transit tests. [5-7, 22, 29, 41]

04 PARTNERS AND SECURITY RECONFIGURE DEPENDENCE

MODERATE / ATTRIBUTED CROSS-CASE INTERPRETATION

Finance, security, buyers and operating services create different obligations and switching costs. The 2025 Mali fuel shock illustrates economic exposure through networks without asset ownership. [18, 26, 30, 32, 53, 55, 57, 62]

05 PRODUCTIVE GAINS MUST BE PROVED SEPARATELY

MODERATE / COMPARATIVE JUDGMENT

Capacity, corridor approvals, ownership changes and settlements do not by themselves demonstrate affordable service, retained value or broad welfare gains. Outcomes require enterprise, fiscal and distributional evidence. [10-11, 26, 32-39, 48-57]

REGIONAL TEST Identify the controlling interface, credible substitutes, switching costs and who retains value. Distinguish documented mechanisms from estimated economic effects.

CHAPTER 01 / THE REGION IN CONTEXT

Distinct economies. Interconnected choices.

The ecological Sahel, political groupings and economic networks have different boundaries.

THE STARTING PROPOSITION

The Sahel is a geography of production, exchange and strategic access. Political borders, trading networks and resource systems overlap without creating a single economic or institutional order.

THREE GEOGRAPHIES TO DISTINGUISH**ECOLOGICAL**

Rainfall gradients, river basins and seasonal pastoral movements shape livelihoods and risk. This environmental belt extends beyond the five countries selected here.

**POLITICAL**

The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) groups Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. This grouping is distinct from the five-country study and from the wider ecological Sahel. [29]

**ECONOMIC**

Trade, electricity, livestock, finance and export chains link inland producers with coastal gateways and markets outside the study area. [8-15, 20-23]

WHY THESE FIVE COUNTRIES?

Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad provide a selected comparison across Atlantic and inland access, West and Central African institutions, and different productive systems. This is an analytical study area, rather than a definition of the entire Sahel. [6-7, 9, 19-23]

THE STRATEGIC QUESTION

For each relationship, ask: which essential function depends on an external network; what would switching cost; who retains value; and would the alternative strengthen productive capability? Geography shapes the options, while operating arrangements determine which options can be used.

Sources[6-15,19-23,29]. Study-area selection is analytical, not a definition of the whole Sahel.

CHAPTER 01 / COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

Five countries, distinct geoeconomic positions

Compare the same functions across countries before drawing strategic conclusions.

THE COMPARATIVE PROPOSITION

Access to supplies, transport, buyers and finance depends on each economy's productive structure, institutions and commercial arrangements. The comparison below identifies selected mechanisms.

COUNTRY COMPARISON / SELECTED SYSTEMS AND DEPENDENCIES

COUNTRY	PRODUCTIVE SYSTEMS	ACCESS / SERVICES	STRATEGIC QUESTION
MALI	Gold production and fuel-dependent economic activity. [18, 34]	Western and southern gateway networks; mine operation and fuel delivery. [8, 18, 34]	Can access reliability and operating continuity improve value retained?
BURKINA FASO	Agriculture and mining; electricity for productive activity. [9, 15]	Coastal corridors and cross-border power supply create different exposures. [9, 15]	Which transport and power alternatives are affordable and reliable?
NIGER	Oil production and export-linked public receipts. [12-14]	Agadem-Sèmè export chain; transit coordination and claims on future receipts. [12-14]	How do transit reliability and repayment terms affect usable revenue?
CHAD	Oil-linked revenue; agriculture and livestock value chains. [19-20]	Cameroon transit interface, Central African monetary services and oil-linked finance. [7, 11, 32]	Can oil revenue support a more diverse productive economy?
MAURITANIA	Resource exports and opportunities for diversification. [21-22, 39]	Atlantic access alongside external buyers, technology and operating services. [21-22, 33, 39]	Does maritime access translate into broader capabilities and buyer choice?

WHAT THE COMPARISON ESTABLISHES


The exposed function differs: a general trade corridor, an electricity supply, a dedicated oil chain or a buyer arrangement cannot be substituted in the same way. Evaluate alternatives against the function at risk and their full operating cost.

Sources shown in each row. Qualitative mechanisms, not exhaustive economic profiles.

FIGURE 01 / GEOECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

Selected gateway connections

Named interfaces on a geographical base; connections are schematic, not transport alignments.



CONNECTIONS AND THEIR EVIDENCE

Dakar-Bamako [8]; Abidjan, Tema and Lomé-Ouagadougou [9]; Lomé-Ouagadougou-Niamey [10]; Cotonou-Niamey [9, 12]; Douala-N'Djamena [11]; promoted Nouakchott-Bamako interface [23]; Agadem-Sèmè oil-export chain [13-14, 45].

WHAT THIS FIGURE SHOWS

Cotonou is a general transit gateway; Sèmè is the separate oil-export interface. Lines show selected relationships, rather than individual roads, railways or pipeline alignments.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATION

Additional gateways widen choice only when transport, border services, finance and security make them commercially usable.

Geography[24]: Natural Earth1:50m, public domain; equal-area projection. Approximate anchors; schematic connections, not transport alignments or current access certification.

CHAPTER 02 / ECONOMIC POWER AND INSTITUTIONS

Realignment has several institutional layers

Political membership, monetary arrangements and trade access require separate assessment.

THE CENTRAL DISTINCTION

A political decision can change membership without simultaneously changing currency arrangements, payment services or border practice. Each layer has its own rules, implementation and economic effects.

THREE INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS / THE SAME COMPARATIVE LENS

COUNTRY GROUP	POLITICAL / MONETARY SETTING	TRADE AND OPERATING TEST
MALI, BURKINA FASO AND NIGER	AES confederation; withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) effective 29 January 2025. [5, 29]	Identify the applicable trade and mobility arrangements, then verify their border-level implementation.
MONETARY LAYER	All three remain listed in the West African Monetary Union (WAMU), served by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). [6]	Assess payment and banking access separately from ECOWAS membership.
CHAD	A member of the Central African monetary setting served by the Bank of Central African States (BEAC). [7]	Assess its own transit and payment interfaces; do not apply the AES/ECOWAS pathway to Chad.
MAURITANIA	National monetary institutions, including the Central Bank of Mauritania; a separate setting from the two monetary unions above. [22, 41]	Assess bilateral access, customs practice and payment arrangements on their own terms.

A DOCUMENTED EXAMPLE / TRANSITION IS NOT AUTOMATIC INTERRUPTION

ECOWAS’s 29 January 2025 statement requested continued treatment of specified trade and mobility arrangements during transition. This dated instruction illustrates the distinction; it does not establish uniform implementation or unchanged rules in October 2026. [5]

THE NEXT ANALYTICAL STEP

Page 9 traces how institutional rules reach firms through documents, customs, mobility and payments.

Sources[5-7,22,29,41]. ECOWAS statement:January2025; membership pages checked26 October2026. Border implementation requires separate evidence.

FIGURE 02 / INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DECISIONS

From institutional rules to economic consequences

Trace the mechanism before attributing an economic outcome to political realignment.

THE ANALYTICAL POINT

Page 8 distinguishes institutional settings. This figure tests how a decision reaches the economy: identify the rule, the operating channel and the observable consequence. A membership change alone does not measure its effect.

FOUR TRANSMISSION CHANNELS / WHAT MUST BE OBSERVED

INSTITUTIONAL RULE	OPERATING CHANNEL	EVIDENCE TO TEST
TRADE TREATMENT	Eligibility rules, origin documents and tariff treatment affect landed cost.	Applicable dated instructions; customs assessments; charges and clearance records.
MOBILITY	Recognised documents and entry permissions affect traders, workers and transport crews.	Document acceptance; crossing delays; refusals and the populations affected.
PAYMENTS	Banking rules and settlement channels affect transaction execution and liquidity.	Payment completion, fees, settlement delays and correspondent access.
TRANSIT	Bilateral arrangements and border procedures affect corridor usability.	Transit documents, release times, freight costs and continuity of service.

KEEP THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS DISTINCT

AES states: distinguish ECOWAS withdrawal from WAMU/BCEAO membership. Assess Chad's BEAC setting and Mauritania's national institutions separately (page 8). [5-7, 22, 29, 41]

INTERPRETING INFLUENCE / THREE DIFFERENT EXPLANATIONS

DELIBERATE STATECRAFT

An economic instrument serves a strategic objective. Intent requires supporting evidence.

STRUCTURAL LEVERAGE

Dependence on a hard-to-replace service can constrain choice without a demonstrated political threat.

OTHER ECONOMIC EFFECTS

Commercial terms, prices, security or technical failures can change outcomes without a statecraft purpose.

Sources[1-7,22,29,41]. Statecraft requires evidence of strategic intent; structural dependence alone does not establish coercion.

FIGURE 03 / STRUCTURAL TRADE EXPOSURE


Commodity export shares and import composition

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) country profiles: 2021-2023. [28]

A / COMMODITY EXPORT SHARE AND LEADING PRODUCT


Shares of allocated merchandise export value (%)

Commodity share (%)



B / FOOD AND ENERGY IMPORT SHARES

Shares of allocated merchandise import value (%)



READ THE TWO PANELS SEPARATELY

Commodity share indicates export dependence; it is not a concentration index. Import shares describe trade composition, not reliance on imports for consumption. These measures do not form one dependency score.

Source[28], 2021-23 merchandise shares. Niger's profile predates the May2024 oil-export milestone[45]; gold's historical lead is not a description of the later export mix. Different panel scales.

CHAPTER 03 / ECONOMIC SECURITY AND DEPENDENCIES

The Four Fs: essential economic security

Food, fertilizers, fuel and finance: linked channels for assessing practical economic choice.

THE FRAMEWORK IN ONE QUESTION

When an essential supply or financing system is disrupted, who is affected, how quickly, and which affordable alternatives can sustain livelihoods and productive activity?

FOUR CHANNELS / EXPOSURE, EVIDENCE AND STRATEGIC RESPONSE

01 FOOD

Availability, affordability and access

Track prices, market access and livelihood effects. Historical food-import shares provide context, not a food-security outcome. [28, 40]

Decision test: Which supplies and delivery networks remain dependable under stress?

02 FERTILIZERS

Nutrients, delivery timing and farm costs

Match nutrient supply to crop, soil and season. [42] A comparable five-country fertilizer exposure series has not been established here.

Decision test: Which crop systems face seasonal supply risks, and what viable sourcing or nutrient-management options exist?

03 FUEL

Transport, power and productive continuity

Distinguish fuel supply from electricity access. Observe delivery, outages and costs; do not equate energy-import share with supply reliability. [15, 18, 28, 40]

Decision test: Which activities need continuity measures, stocks or alternative supply?

04 FINANCE

Liquidity, payment access and obligations

Examine credit, settlement and repayment terms. Niger's advance and Chad's oil-linked repayments illustrate distinct contractual mechanisms. [12, 32]

Decision test: Which terms constrain usable resources, and what would an alternative cost?

TEST THE LINKS; DO NOT ASSUME A COMMON OUTCOME

Fuel and finance constraints can affect input delivery and food affordability. Verify timing, exposure, substitutability and distributional effects in each case. This framework is an analytical lens, not a composite index or an exhaustive security model.

Sources[12,15,18,28,32,40,42]. Comparable five-country fertilizer exposure remains incomplete.

CHAPTER 03 / ECONOMIC SECURITY AND DEPENDENCIES


How the Four Fs transmit disruption

A diagnostic model: identify exposure, test the mechanism and assess the response.

HOW TO APPLY THE MODEL

Start with the exposed supply or payment function. Follow each link to a dated observation, then apply the six tests below. Record missing evidence before judging the response.

CONCEPTUAL DIAGRAM / PATHWAYS TO TEST



SIX TESTS / APPLY EACH TO THE FUNCTION AT RISK

AVAILABILITY	Can the required supply or service be obtained?
AFFORDABILITY	At what full delivered cost, and for whom?
CONCENTRATION	How reliant is the function on a few routes or providers?
SUBSTITUTION	Which alternatives work, at what cost and lead time?
SHOCK TRANSMISSION	Who is affected, through which channel and how quickly?
PRODUCTIVE CAPABILITY	Can the response sustain output, skills and local suppliers?

INTERPRETATION

Arrows are hypotheses. Test rainfall, conflict, policy and adaptive responses alongside supply shocks; a usable substitute can weaken transmission.

Conceptual synthesis informed by [15,18-20,22,40,42]. Arrows are hypotheses; rainfall, conflict and adaptive responses can change transmission.

CHAPTER 03 / ECONOMIC SECURITY AND DEPENDENCIES

Country exposure and strategic choices

Bounded judgments: distinguish an established event, retained benefit and a qualified alternative.

THE ASSESSMENT RESULT

These energy/finance cases establish selected operating, capacity, payment or debt events. None provides a complete net public-value account or proves a substitute economically superior. The priorities below are conditional responses to the documented constraint, not investment approvals.

COUNTRY / FINDING / CONDITIONAL PRIORITY

COUNTRY / SOURCES	WHAT THE RECORD ESTABLISHES	ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE
MALI [18, 34, 40]	Reported restoration of mine management and a settlement transfer establish separate operating and cash events, not measured net public value.	Prioritise fuel continuity and settlement reconciliation. Test production, public costs and local effects; no replacement route or revised deal is certified superior.
BURKINA FASO [36-38, 46]	Commissioned capacity and disclosed financing establish an asset. Delivered affordability, full purchase terms, public exposure and net local benefit need further evidence.	Compare firm supply, generation, grid services and backup on delivery, full costs and obligations. Include land/community outcomes; no least-cost mix is established.
NIGER [26-27, 44-45]	First cargo establishes export capability; assigned receipts affect public cash. Prices and agriculture also matter. Current deductions and net receipts remain unverified.	Reconcile cash and maintain usable access before preferring a replacement. Appraise volume, rights, finance, security and switching cost; road access is not an equivalent pipeline.
CHAD [19-20, 32]	IMF records lower Glencore exposure through end-2024 alongside accelerated repayment. That debt-stock improvement does not measure cash available for current spending.	Compare receipts, debt service and spending under price stress. Buffers, refinancing and non-oil production face different costs; none is costed as superior here.
MAURITANIA [21-22, 33, 39]	First cargo establishes an export milestone. Kosmos-specific sales terms do not determine national marketing freedom; net fiscal and domestic benefits remain unverified.	Identify the rights-holder and reconcile public value. Buyer changes, supplier services or domestic processing require lawful access, capability and verified demand.

Sources in each row. Apply the six tests on p12 and distinct-account rule on p14. These are selected case judgments.

CHAPTER 04 / STRATEGIC RESOURCES, CONTROL AND VALUE CREATION

From strategic assets to productive value

Trace rights, operations and financial claims before assessing benefits retained domestically.

THE STRATEGIC DISTINCTION

Ownership, operating authority, project revenue and public receipts describe different things. Their relationship depends on contracts, infrastructure, costs and implementation.

RELATIONSHIPS TO EXAMINE / FOUR ANALYTICAL LAYERS

01 RESOURCE RIGHTS

Legal title, licences and access

Who holds which rights, for how long, and with which obligations?



02 OPERATIONS AND ACCESS

Operators, services, transport and buyers

Who can keep production and delivery working, and what alternatives exist?



03 COMMERCIAL CLAIMS

Sales, costs, repayment and financing

Which claims are paid, by whom, from which proceeds and in what sequence?



04 DOMESTIC OUTCOMES

Public receipts and wider economic effects

What reaches public accounts, local suppliers, workers and productive investment?

ASSESS PUBLIC CASH AND WIDER VALUE SEPARATELY

Public cash: reconcile realised receipts and payments, including debt service; disclose contingent liabilities separately.

Wider domestic value: assess value added, labour income, capability and social/environmental burdens. Define the period and affected groups; do not add overlapping components.

QUALIFY AN ALTERNATIVE BEFORE PREFERRING IT

Require the same function, usable rights and capacity, full costs, finance and realistic timing. An unqualified option is not an established improvement.


Evaluative framework informed by [12-14,25-26,32-38]. Public cash and wider domestic value require distinct accounting boundaries.

FIGURE 04 / STRATEGIC RESOURCES, CONTROL AND VALUE

Niger oil: control and value

One physical export chain; distinct jurisdictions, operating rights and financial claims.

A / THE PHYSICAL CHAIN



Arrows indicate the direction of physical movement. They do not allocate ownership or money. [13-14, 45]

DISTINCT RIGHTS / THE FUNCTION OF EACH LAYER

TERRITORIAL	Niger: production jurisdiction. Benin: terminal access and loading authority.
OPERATING	West African Oil Pipeline Company (WAPCO): pipeline operation and services. [13]
CONTRACTUAL	Access, transport, sales and financing terms govern the claims on proceeds.
PUBLIC CASH	Trace the government's entitlement, deductions, payments and liabilities separately.

B / HISTORICAL 2024 ADVANCE AS DESCRIBED IN THE 2026 DSA [26]

US\$400m Loan equivalent	7% Interest rate	12 to 16 months Initial / extendable term
The debt sustainability analysis (DSA) classifies the CFA-franc loan from resident CNPC-NP, a China National Petroleum Corporation subsidiary, as domestic debt. It reports an anticipated government share corresponding to 25.36% of total pipeline exports, with up to 80% of that share withheld for debt service.		

C / VALUE-REALISATION TEST

Separate gross sales, government entitlement, net public cash and domestic value added. Historical loan terms do not establish the October 2026 balance or current deductions.

Sources[13-14,26,45]. Historical2024 advance;80% applies to the anticipated government share, not total exports. Icons:Font Awesome Free,CC BY4.0; editorial vectors.

CHAPTER 04 / STRATEGIC RESOURCES, CONTROL AND VALUE CREATION

The border dispute entered the oil chain

Selected public records distinguish loading permission, cargo movement and operating coordination.



SELECTED EVENTS / INTERVALS NOT TO SCALE

WHAT THE RECORD ESTABLISHES

The records distinguish access decisions, loading and coordination. They do not establish uninterrupted exports or quantified losses. Land-border trade and pipeline loading remain separate interfaces.

Sources[13,27,43,45]. Selected dates; ladder intervals are not to scale. Land-border trade and pipeline loading are distinct interfaces.

CHAPTER 04 / STRATEGIC RESOURCES, CONTROL AND VALUE CREATION

An export breakthrough with continuing exposure

Assess operating resilience, public cash and productive linkages alongside export capability.

01 WHAT CHANGED

EVIDENCE / EXPOSURE

Benin documented the first cargo's departure in May 2024. [45] On 8 October 2026, IMF staff projected 7% economy-wide growth for 2026, citing agriculture and extractive activity. [44]



ASSESSMENT TEST

IMF also cites higher oil prices. Separate price, output and agricultural effects; the forecast cannot isolate realignment benefits. [44]

02 WHAT REMAINS EXPOSED

EVIDENCE / EXPOSURE

Assess pipeline security, cross-border services, loading procedures, prices and claims on receipts. The August 2026 IMF report documents continuing land-border disruption. [27]



ASSESSMENT TEST

Test each operating function. Quantify losses only where evidence supports them.

03 WHAT DETERMINES PUBLIC VALUE

RECONCILIATION REQUIRED

Reconcile realised government receipts, assigned debt service, public payments and liabilities. Separately assess local supplier value added, skills, employment and productive investment.



ASSESSMENT TEST

Define beneficiaries, period and accounting boundary. Avoid double counting.

STRATEGIC INTERPRETATION / CONDITIONAL

Usable access and assigned receipts identify mechanisms to examine, not the cause of every fiscal change. Prices, harvests, security and implementation can reinforce or offset their effects. Appraise alternatives against engineering, rights, finance, demand and execution; the record does not isolate a net realignment effect.

Sources[26-27,44-45]. IMF7% is a dated economy-wide forecast; agriculture and prices are material rival explanations.

CHAPTER 04 / VALUE CREATION, CAPTURE AND RETENTION

From resource control to retained productive wealth

A five-ledger test prevents export earnings, financing and public benefit from being counted as the same economic gain.

01 PRODUCTION

Physical output, value added and costs

Do not equate gross export sales with domestic value added.

02 INCOME ALLOCATION

Wages, profits, supplier income and rents

Identify domestic and foreign recipients; avoid overlapping totals.

03 FISCAL REALISATION

Taxes, royalties, dividends and public costs

Reconcile assessed entitlements with cash actually received.

04 FINANCING & CASH

Advances, borrowing, debt service and guarantees

A loan disbursement is liquidity, not earned fiscal revenue.

05 PRODUCTIVE WEALTH

Skills, capabilities, assets and future obligations

Test durable gains net of depreciation and liabilities.

THREE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS

Niger: separate gross oil exports, the government share, deductions under historical financing terms and realised public cash. [26-27, 44-45]

Mali: distinguish mineral ownership, operating continuity and reported settlement payments from audited net public receipts or national value added. [34, 40, 53-54]

Burkina Faso: assess mineral revenue and the full delivered cost of energy alongside local suppliers, industrial use and long-term obligations. [36-38, 46, 51-52]

ANALYTICAL RULE

A shift in legal control is an observable institutional change. A rise in retained national value requires separate, dated evidence across the five ledgers.

CHAPTER 05 / ENERGY, CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

Domestic power through negotiated interdependence

Kodéni solar, commissioned in 2023: finance, domestic supply and productive choice. [38]

THE CENTRAL QUESTION

When financed generation adds domestic capacity, do reliable delivery, affordable procurement and workable contractual obligations expand productive choice?

DOCUMENTED PARAMETERS / PROJECT DISCLOSURES [36, 38]

38 MWp

Megawatts peak: rated solar capacity, not annual output.

EUR 40.5m

Project cost disclosed by FMO, the development bank.

EUR 32.4m

Syndicated project debt; not a measure of sovereign debt.

25 years

SONABEL, national utility; take-or-pay per developer. Payment triggers and risk allocation need the contract.

EXPLANATORY SCHEMATIC / FINANCE TO PRODUCTIVE VALUE



Each arrow is a relationship to verify. Finance and installed capacity alone do not demonstrate delivered benefits.

BOUNDED ASSESSMENT / CAPACITY IS NOT THE FINAL BENEFIT

FMO expected attractive tariffs from long-tenor finance; this remains an expectation. [36] Commissioned capacity is documented, but affordable service and net value need delivered output, full obligations and a credible supply comparator.

LAND AND COMMUNITY OBLIGATIONS

FMO disclosed land-replacement and community risks. Africa REN describes community measures; neither source independently establishes completed safeguards or net local benefit. Verify affected people's outcomes. [36, 38]

Sources[36-38]. Historical project finance and developer purchase description. Payment triggers require the contract; community measures are attributed.

FIGURE 05 / ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCE AND PRODUCTIVE CHOICE

Different energy systems, different vulnerabilities

Distinguish electricity-supply composition from disruption of fuel delivery.

A / BURKINA FASO: 2024 ELECTRICITY SUPPLY MIX [46]

National production plus electricity imports = 2.769 TWh



Imports: 1.358 TWh

National production: 1.411 TWh

A SECOND DENOMINATOR / WITHIN IMPORTS ONLY

Ghana: 1.149 TWh / total imports: 1.358 TWh. This denominator excludes domestic production. [46]

GHANA 84.6%

Other suppliers: 15.4% / shares of imports only

B / MALI: A DATED FUEL-DISTRIBUTION SHOCK [18]

The IMF's March 2026 assessment reports that fuel-supply disruption following attacks dampened economic activity in late 2025. This is an operating episode, not a statistic comparable with Burkina Faso's 2024 electricity mix.

C / TWO TRANSMISSION PATHS TO TEST

ELECTRICITY IMPORTS

Supply and contracts shape power availability and cost



Test firms' output and costs

FUEL CORRIDORS

Security and logistics shape fuel delivery and transport cost



Test enterprise continuity

STRATEGIC TEST

Compare reliability, full delivered cost and usable substitutes. Domestic generation, electricity imports, backup power and fuel stocks have distinct benefits, constraints and obligations. A dependence percentage alone cannot measure resilience.

Source[46],SONABEL2024 Tables5-7. Supply=production+imports,not sales. Ghana combines HTB/HTA;84.6% denominator is imports only. Mali episode[18]:late2025.

FIGURE 06 / CONTRACT TERMS AND OBSERVABLE CONSEQUENCES

Authority, operation and settlement

Capital commitments also depend on resource rights, operating access and settlement terms.

A / DOCUMENTED SEQUENCE: 2025 [16, 34]

16 JUN	Court placed the complex under provisional administration.
23 JUN	Administrator assumed day-to-day operational management.
24 NOV	Agreement to end the dispute was announced.
28 NOV	Barrick reports FCFA 143bn (US\$253m) paid to Mali as part of the global settlement.
16 DEC	Provisional administration ended; operating control returned to mine management.

B / RIGHTS AND CONSEQUENCES REQUIRE DIFFERENT EVIDENCE

REGULATORY AUTHORITY	EQUITY OWNERSHIP	OPERATING CONTROL	SETTLEMENT PAYMENT
Mali's laws, licences and public decisions.	Barrick reports an 80% interest; equity is distinct from state authority.	Who exercised day-to-day management, and when?	Company-reported payment; net public benefit requires reconciliation.

VALUE-CAPTURE TEST

The reported US\$253m payment is one component of a wider settlement. Assess public cash, taxes, production interruption, public costs and liabilities separately from supplier, employment and capability effects. Define the period and avoid double counting.

Barrick's filing supplies the detailed dates and payment amount; Mali's announcement corroborates the agreement. Claims about contractual violations remain attributed to the company. [16, 34]

Sources[16-17,34]. Barrick reports the payment as one settlement component; court order, administrator takeover and management restoration are distinct events.

CHAPTER 06 / PRODUCTIVE CAPABILITIES AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

Productive systems connect territories and livelihoods

Judge connections by the practical options they create for producers, firms and communities.

WHAT PRODUCTIVE CAPABILITY MEANS

Productive capability is the ability to produce reliably, meet standards, develop skills and suppliers, and retain value. Test whether connections strengthen those abilities and widen participation.

SELECTED PRODUCTIVE PATHWAYS / CONNECTIONS AND OUTCOME TESTS

01 FOOD SYSTEMS

Storage, feeder access, inputs and wholesale markets connect production with buyers. [9, 20]

OUTCOME TEST Observe producer margins, storage losses, repeat sales and food affordability.

02 PASTORAL LIVELIHOODS

Grazing, water, animal health, agreed access rules and market facilities support seasonal production and exchange. [47]

OUTCOME TEST Observe usable routes, access disputes, livestock health and participation in markets.

03 INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE VALUE CHAINS

Appraise processing, manufacturing, mineral transformation and productive services against skills, standards, inputs and demand.

OUTCOME TEST Observe reliable output, supplier value added, workforce skills and repeat customer orders.

CAPABILITY, GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION

Test technology access, maintenance skills, standards, finance and reliable urban services alongside production. Check procurement accountability, enforceable obligations and user redress. More activity alone does not show that institutions or firms can sustain it.

Assess land and water access, climate exposure and environmental burdens alongside returns. Identify who benefits or bears costs, including smaller producers, women and mobile communities. These are appraisal requirements, not measured five-country outcomes.


Sources[9,20,47]. Productive pathways are appraisal questions. PRAPS-2 covers six countries, including Senegal.

CHAPTER 06 / PRODUCTIVE & INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION

From economic activity to productive capability

Five-country comparison | evidence and outcome tests, not an industrialisation ranking

FIGURE 11 / FIVE COMPLEMENTARY CAPABILITY TESTS



COUNTRY / DOCUMENTED BASELINE / CAPABILITY TEST

MALI

IMF (2026): lithium supported secondary-sector activity; late-2025 fuel shortages constrained manufacturing and transport.

TEST Test processing, supplier contracts, reliable energy and repeated output.

Source: IMF 2026/165

BURKINA FASO

World Bank (2026): agriculture, services and mining contributed to recovery; agricultural transformation project approved in March.

TEST Verify commissioned processing, productive jobs and reliable power; approval is not delivery.

Source: WB Jun/Mar 2026

NIGER

World Bank (2025): 2024 growth reflected oil exports and agriculture; the agri-food system requires upgrading.

TEST Separate extractive output from agri-food productivity, local processing and value retention.

Source: WB Jun 2025

CHAD

World Bank (2023): diversification opportunities in agriculture, livestock and light processing face logistics and input constraints.

TEST Measure viable meat, milk and crop chains, service reliability and market access.

Source: WB CEM 2023

MAURITANIA

World Bank (2026): extractives remain important; its 2025-30 strategy prioritises diversification, jobs and enterprise capacity.

TEST Test non-extractive firms, skills, processing, market links and durable jobs.

Source: WB country/CPF

EVIDENCE LADDER / CLAIM ONLY THE STAGE SHOWN

**ANNOUNCED**

Policy, funding, plan

**OPERATIONAL**

Repeated verified delivery

**RETAINED**

Measured domestic benefit

FIGURE 07 / COMPARATIVE STRATEGIC CHOICE

Dependencies, substitutes and bargaining

Five country mechanisms: distinguish documented change from choices requiring appraisal.

COMPARE THE FUNCTION AND THE TERMS

Actors seek different benefits and hold different rights. Trace the instrument, operating constraint and observed consequence before assessing an alternative. A new partner or route is useful only if it can perform the required function at a viable cost.

COUNTRY / DATED RECORD / MECHANISM / CHOICE TO ASSESS

COUNTRY / EVIDENCE	INSTRUMENT AND CONSEQUENCE	OPTION / FEASIBILITY TEST
MALI 2025 fuel disruption, mine control and settlement; 2026 reporting. [18, 34, 40]	A negotiated dispute resolution can explain restored operation. The settlement sequence does not establish geopolitical coercion, state motive or net public and domestic gains.	Compare secure fuel delivery and workable mine operation. Verify production, public cash, costs and local effects; test route capacity and enforceable terms.
BURKINA FASO 2024 power mix; historical Kodéni financing, commissioning and purchase terms. [36, 38, 46]	Purchase terms can enable financing. Grid, weather and maintenance can affect delivery; capacity alone establishes neither user benefit nor harm.	Identify payer and risk-holder at each interface. Compare purchaser and lender rights, payment exposure and the full cost of changing provider.
NIGER 2024 advance and first cargo; 2026 transit assessment. [26-27, 45]	Assigned claims, output and prices affect receipts; cross-border operation affects access. The record does not isolate realignment from security, technical or market effects.	Reconcile receipts and deductions. Test access options against volume, rights, full cost and switching time. A general road gateway is not an equivalent pipeline substitute.
CHAD Oil-price-linked repayment through end-2024. IMF historical account. [32]	IMF links faster repayment to prices and the repayment clause, not reprofiling alone. Lower debt exposure does not demonstrate greater spending capacity.	Test spending capacity against prices, receipts and the whole creditor portfolio. Appraise buffers and non-oil earnings against demand, finance and standards. [19-20]
MAURITANIA Kosmos sales terms, 2024; first Greater Tortue Ahmeyim cargo, 2025. [33, 39]	Kosmos reports a buyer restriction but expected no long-term financial impact from the award. First cargo is an export milestone, not a net-benefit finding.	Separate Kosmos's rights from sovereign rights. Test buyer flexibility, suppliers and switching costs against contracts and demand; reconcile proceeds with public accounts.

Sources shown in rows. Compare functions, rights and alternatives; Kosmos's no-long-term-impact statement is an issuer expectation.

CHAPTER 06 / CORRIDORS AND PRODUCTIVE INTEGRATION

From reliable movement to productive capability

A corridor combines services, institutions and productive connections; test each level of results.

ANALYTICAL LADDER / THREE DISTINCT LEVELS OF EVIDENCE

01

MOVEMENT AND RULES

Infrastructure, border procedures, permits and payments.

Evidence: Door-to-door time, variability, full delivered cost and document failures.

TEST

02

PRODUCTIVE CONNECTIONS

Feeder access, power, skills, finance, standards and buyers.

Evidence: Repeat contracts, supplier participation and actual use of facilities.

TEST

03

ECONOMIC AGENCY

Usable buyer and supplier alternatives; retained value and continuity.

Evidence: Switching cost and time, enterprise resilience, user benefits and public liabilities.

These are evidence levels, not a sequence of development stages. Movement and facility use are intermediate indicators; retained value needs measured outcomes, baselines, distributional evidence and rival explanations. The six analytical pillars interact across all three levels.

CROSS-PILLAR FEEDBACK / RELATIONSHIPS TO TEST

Security affects usable access; delivery failures can weaken enterprise cash flow and maintenance, further reducing continuity. Purchase and repayment terms affect usable cash; productive demand can improve asset use, while weak demand can expose fixed obligations. Test both directions: these are hypotheses, not measured causal loops. [18, 26, 36, 38]

DOCUMENTED PROGRAMMES / EVIDENCE STAGE MATTERS

Lomé-Ouagadougou-Niamey: the May 2025 paper proposes changes to Niger road works, Burkina Faso implementation and fleet support, and monitoring. It does not establish delivery. [10]

Cameroon-Chad: the World Bank announced US\$538 million approval on 15 February 2022; approval alone does not demonstrate user benefits. [11]


Sources[9-11,18,26,36,38]. Evidence levels are not automatic stages; programme approval and restructuring proposals differ from delivery.

CHAPTER 06 / CROSS-PILLAR GEOECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Where economic power is exercised

Three documented mechanisms. Different interfaces of control. No assumed net-development payoff.

FIGURE 09 / THREE PATHWAYS OF GEOECONOMIC POWER



WHAT THE RECORD ESTABLISHES

NIGER

The first oil cargo in May 2024 establishes export capability. Pipeline operation, Benin loading permissions and the historical advance involve distinct operating and financial claims. Current net public receipts are not established.

SOURCE BASIS [13, 26-27, 43-45]

BURKINA FASO

The 2024 electricity supply mix and Koden project financing are documented. Commissioned capacity and purchase terms do not, by themselves, establish delivered affordability or net productive benefit.

SOURCE BASIS [36-38, 46]

MALI

IMF reporting attributes 2025 fuel-distribution disruption to attacks. Government and company accounts document the Loulo-Goukoto settlement and return of operational control; net national gains remain unmeasured.

SOURCE BASIS [16-18, 34, 40]

CROSS-CASE GEOECONOMIC FINDING

Economic power is exercised at the interfaces between authority, physical access, finance and essential services. These cases demonstrate mechanisms of control, not verified net welfare effects.


Source-check: selected primary records cross-checked; complete bibliography audit and publication clearance remain open.

CHAPTER 06 / CITY GATEWAYS & CORRIDOR POWER

A gateway is an economic interface

Coastal ports, inland nodes and border institutions jointly shape usable access.

FIGURE 10 / FOUR CONDITIONS OF USABLE CORRIDOR CHOICE



SELECTED GATEWAY SYSTEMS / NOT CURRENT ROUTE PERFORMANCE

MALI

Bamako logistics market; Dakar and Abidjan maritime gateways.
Road and border services govern substitutability; historic Dakar-Bamako rail operation cannot be assumed.

BURKINA FASO

Ouagadougou distribution hub; Lome, Tema and Abidjan gateways.
Competing corridors require comparable delivered costs, crossing times and productive links.

NIGER

Niamey inland market; Cotonou and Lome general-freight interfaces.
Seme is a distinct dedicated oil-loading terminal; do not conflate it with container transit.

CHAD

N'Djamena inland gateway; Douala road-rail and border system.
World Bank approval supports an investment programme, not measured benefits or completion.

MAURITANIA

Nouakchott coastal port and inland commercial connections.
Atlantic access differs from landlocked dependence; Nouakchott-Bamako is a promoted interface.

WHY THE INLAND GATEWAY MATTERS

Ports do not create productive corridors by themselves. Inland freight consolidation, warehousing, customs and border clearance, reliable energy, industrial demand and buyer access determine whether movement becomes retained value. These are mechanisms to test, not verified outcomes for every city.

GEOECONOMIC FINDING

Gateway diversification improves strategic choice only where an alternative is legally accessible, operationally reliable, financially viable and connected to productive users. More routes on a map do not prove stronger bargaining power.

SOURCE SCOPE: World Bank corridor studies; UNCTAD Cotonou-Niamey survey (2022-23); World Bank Cameroon-Chad approval (2022); Mauritania transport ministry. Historical route descriptions and programme approvals are not 2026 performance observations.

POWER, PARTNERS AND GATEWAYS

Realignment changes the negotiating field

Actors hold different instruments: security cooperation, capital, resource rights and access to markets.

FRANCE / UNITED STATES / RUSSIA

French departure from Niger in December 2023 and the US withdrawal by September 2024 changed security relationships. US-hosted research documents Russian/Africa Corps engagement. This establishes a changed partner configuration; it does not prove a particular mineral-for-security contract. [62-63]

CHINA / TÜRKİYE / GULF CAPITAL

CNPC-linked oil finance and Ganfeng's Goulamina role combine capital with productive participation. Türkiye's October 2024 mining memorandum adds a cooperation channel; it is not delivered output. IMF records UAE/Abu Dhabi-linked budget support in Chad, a distinct source of public liquidity. [26, 30, 32, 53, 55]

COASTAL STATES AND MOROCCO

Benin's loading role shows the leverage of an operating gateway. Morocco's Atlantic-access initiative, discussed with Sahel ministers in Marrakech in December 2023, offers a diplomatic route proposition. An offered gateway becomes bargaining power only when usable services, rights and costs are established. [43-45, 61]

CONTINENTAL RULES / AfCFTA

Trading under the African Continental Free Trade Area began in January 2021. Continental market rules can support diversification, but they do not themselves provide a functioning border, secure convoy, bank settlement or substitute export line. ECOWAS withdrawal and AfCFTA implementation are different institutional questions. [5-7, 60]

JUDGMENT

Security partnerships affect protection; finance affects liquidity; operators affect production; gateways affect delivery. These instruments create different dependencies and switching costs. Bargaining strength depends on credible alternatives at each interface. [26, 30, 32, 43-45, 53, 55, 60-63]

Dated actor records and interpretation: [26, 30, 32, 43-45, 53, 55, 60-63]. World Bank partnership frameworks [31] concern another development-finance channel, not proof of geopolitical alignment. No continent-wide Gulf or Russian strategy is inferred from one case.

RESOURCE CONTROL / NIGER URANIUM

SOMAIR: sovereignty meets the operating chain

The dispute connects Niger's control claim with a French nuclear-fuel company's rights and commercial access.

DECEMBER2024**OPERATING CONTROL PRECEDED NATIONALISATION**

Orano reports losing operational control of SOMAIR in December 2024 and initiating arbitration in January 2025. Its account separates a loss of day-to-day control from a later change claimed in legal ownership. [50]

19 JUNE2025**THE STATE ASSERTED FULL OWNERSHIP**

ANP reports that Niger decided to nationalise SOMAIR, transferring shares and assets to the state and providing for compensation subject to stated obligations. The government presented the measure as a means to improve control and national returns. Those stated objectives are not measured outcomes. [48]

JUNE2025**ORANO CONTESTED THE MEASURE**

Orano opposed the nationalisation and characterised it as dispossession. The competing accounts establish a dispute over rights and control; this review does not adjudicate legality or adopt either party's allegations as an independent finding. [49-50]

WHAT THE CASE ADDS

The state can alter domestic ownership and exercise operating authority while the realisation of value still depends on staff, inputs, sales rights, buyers, transport and finance. The dispute therefore supports the control-versus-value distinction in a politically consequential uranium case.

WHAT WOULD CHANGE THE JUDGMENT

Verified production, lawful sales, realised proceeds, compensation and rehabilitation obligations would show how the redistributed control translated into national returns.

Sources [48-50]: Niger government account through ANP and Orano statements. Events are dated; no current stockpile ownership, uranium transfer to Russia, export volume or settled legal outcome is asserted.

MINING REFORM / OWNERSHIP AND IMPLEMENTATION

Different instruments, a common control question

Legislation, state vehicles, negotiated equity and nationalisation change different parts of the bargain.

MALI / LAW AND STATE VEHICLE

Mali adopted its mining code in 2023; implementation followed in 2024. SOREM was created in August 2022, according to the minister. It therefore predates the new code: the vehicle and the legal reform should not be treated as one event. [51, 55]

GOULAMINA / EQUITY AND A CHINESE PARTNER

The government's 2024 account reports an increase in state-and-national participation from 20% to 35% under the Goulamina agreement. The minister identifies Ganfeng as operator. The percentage concerns the combined domestic participation described in that dated account, not 35% of gross revenue. [53, 55]

BURKINA FASO / CODE AND SOPAMIB

The new mining code is Law 016-2024/ALT of 18 July 2024, not a 2023 replacement code. A July 2024 decree modified SOPAMIB's founding decree of July 2014. Greater state participation can change claims on the sector; effective implementation still requires administrative and operating capacity. [52, 54]

CHAD / FORMER EXXON ASSETS

Savannah reports that its acquisition of the former Esso business closed in December 2022, before Chad's 23 March 2023 nationalisation decree. The intervention is therefore not simply an asset seizure from a still-present Exxon owner. Savannah contested the measure. [56]

COMPARATIVE FINDING

These interventions redistribute rights and claims. Their developmental value depends on executable terms, continuity, fiscal discipline and capability, rather than the ownership percentage alone.

Sources [51-56]. Legal dates, state-vehicle chronology and the equity/revenue distinction are material. Dated minister/company accounts retain attribution; fiscal yield, compensation costs and current operating performance require separate records.

SECURITY, POPULATION AND DISTRIBUTION

The economy is also a terrain of coercion

Denial of delivery can exert power over places, firms and households without ownership of the resource.

MALI / FROM A SECURITY EVENT TO AN ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT

The Africa Center's September 2025 assessment describes JNIM fuel-route pressure and coercion in western Mali; the IMF subsequently reports fuel disruption dampening late 2025 activity. Read together, these records support an economic-pressure mechanism: obstruct delivery, raise scarcity and weaken operating continuity. They do not isolate national losses or prove that every shortage had the same cause. [18, 57]

TRANSMISSION / ANALYTICAL FIGURE

ROUTE DENIAL

Fuel routes obstructed

SCARCITY & COST

→ Fuel scarcity and higher delivery costs

DISRUPTION

→ Transport, power and enterprise disruption

PRESSURE

→ Households and public authority

POPULATION / SCALE OF THE SERVICE CHALLENGE

AU STATAFRIC's 2024 mid-year population compilation reports: Burkina Faso 23.41 m; Mali 24.16 m; Niger 26.31 m; Chad 18.68 m; Mauritania 5.17 m. These are historical source-vintage figures, not 2026 counts. Population scale increases the significance of reliable food, power, jobs and urban services; it does not by itself explain conflict. [64]

DISPLACEMENT / PEOPLE AND LIVELIHOODS

UNHCR's 2025 Sahel overview reports large-scale displacement from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger within and beyond their countries. Displacement can interrupt farming, employment and market access while increasing demand for receiving services. These are transmission mechanisms, not measured effects for every territory. [58]

FOOD SECURITY / KEEP THE GEOGRAPHY AND FORECAST VISIBLE

FAO reported 52.8 million people projected to face acute food insecurity in June-August 2026 across the wider West Africa/Sahel analysis. Burkina Faso did not conduct that cycle. The figure is not a measured five-country total and must not be combined with the displacement estimate. [59]

Interpretation: JNIM is a non-state armed actor; the mechanism is economic coercion, distinct from statecraft. [57] is research analysis, not a combatant-intent or national-loss audit. Population, displacement and food-security figures have different periods and boundaries.

CHAPTER 07 / STRATEGIC INTERPRETATION AND SCENARIOS

Four trajectories, no assigned probabilities

Conditional futures to end-2030; test each relationship rather than classify whole countries.

DATED FRAME / ASSUMPTIONS A1-A8

Evidence cut-off: 26 October 2026. Horizon: end-2030; near-term checkpoint: end-2027. Apply each pathway to a specific relationship and affected users. Pathways may coexist; they are not country classifications, stages or probability forecasts. Assumptions A1-A8 and review rules are in the companion scenario register.

CONDITIONAL PATHWAY / SUPPORTING AND CHALLENGING EVIDENCE

01 FRAGMENTED INTERDEPENDENCE

Access fails repeatedly; weak coordination raises costs while external dependence persists.

SUPPORTS THE PATHWAY

Repeated service loss, payment failures and no workable fallback.

WEAKENS THE PATHWAY

Sustained access restoration and lower variability despite political disagreement.

02 DIVERSIFICATION WITHOUT TRANSFORMATION

More partners and projects coexist with weak delivery, local capability and retained value.

SUPPORTS THE PATHWAY

Commitments accumulate; delivery and capability miss realistic project milestones.

WEAKENS THE PATHWAY

Sustained output, repeat local orders and measured productivity gains.

03 PRAGMATIC ACCOMMODATION

Disagreement persists, but enforceable operating arrangements sustain essential exchange.

SUPPORTS THE PATHWAY

Repeat transit or payment transactions; disputes resolved under workable terms.

WEAKENS THE PATHWAY

Repeated failure, unenforceable access or obligations that prevent continuity.

04 INTEGRATED PRODUCTIVE TRANSFORMATION

Reliable services and viable firms produce distributed net gains under manageable obligations.

SUPPORTS THE PATHWAY

Reliable output, competitive suppliers and benefits after costs and liabilities.

WEAKENS THE PATHWAY

Enclave gains, weak reinvestment or burdens exceeding benefits for affected groups.

Allow realistic project lead times. Security, climate and price shocks can overturn any pathway. Judge recurrence, scale, affected users and rival explanations; a single announcement does not establish a future.

Author-developed conditional pathways; historical basis[12,18,26-27,32-34,36,38,40,46]. Assumptions A1-A8 and review rules are printed on p29.

FIGURE08 / DECISION TRIGGERS AND ANALYTICAL REVISION

From evidence to strategic decision

Assumptions are explicit here; the review does not require an unseen monitoring specification.

A1 / ACCESS

Required routes and services remain practically usable.

A2 / CASH

Obligations leave a workable public/project cash envelope.

A3 / DELIVERY

Assets deliver the service users need, beyond rated capacity.

A4 / CAPABILITY

Demand, skills and suppliers can sustain viable production.

A5 / COORDINATION

Disagreement can coexist with enforceable operating arrangements.

A6 / SHOCKS

Security, climate and price stress can overturn any pathway.

A7 / DISTRIBUTION

Benefits reach intended users after relevant costs and burdens.

A8 / INSTITUTIONS

Political, monetary and border layers can change separately.

REVISION RULE

Observe the event; verify source, date and scope; test rivals; record a revised judgment. Compare access with dated service records, cash with signed terms and reconciled accounts, delivery with realistic milestones, and distribution with affected-group outcomes.

PROPOSED MANUAL REVIEW CALENDAR

First review: 31 January 2027; then quarterly through 2030. Review material rights changes, critical-service loss and major shocks promptly. Missing baselines remain unknown: they are not evidence that a pathway has failed.

REGIONAL CONCLUSION / G1.2 SYNTHESIS

More power over terms. Uneven power over outcomes.

The five cases reveal interconnected economic systems but not one common Sahelian political economy. The regional finding is conditional: strategic choice depends on access to essential cross-border functions and the ability to turn that access into productive returns.

SUPPORTED / REGIONAL SYSTEMS CONDITION NATIONAL CHOICE

Inland export and import chains, payment services, electricity, security and external capital create shared transmission channels. Niger-Benin loading and the corridor cases illustrate why political control within one border cannot alone secure commercial execution. [5-11, 19-23, 26, 43-45]

QUALIFIED / THE FIVE COUNTRIES HAVE DIFFERENT EXPOSURES

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger share AES membership while remaining in the WAMU/BCEAO setting; Chad is linked to the BEAC area, and Mauritania has separate monetary institutions and Atlantic access. Their substitutes and constraints therefore cannot be ranked on one regional scale. [5-7, 19-23, 29, 41]

CHALLENGED / DIVERSIFICATION IS NOT TRANSFORMATION

New partners, legal rights, commissioned capacity and corridor approvals may change bargaining positions. Without evidence of dependable service, affordable contracts, productive linkages and value retention, they do not establish a development payoff. Security, rainfall, prices and execution are rival explanations. [10-11, 18, 26, 32-39, 48-59]

STRATEGIC IMPLICATION / FOUR QUESTIONS

- 01 Who controls each essential interface: rights, access, operations, payments and buyers?
- 02 Which substitutes are legally available, commercially usable and affordable?
- 03 What obligations and disruptions shift costs to firms, households or public finances?
- 04 Which observable outcomes show retained value, productive capability and resilience?

EVIDENCE BOUNDARY

Selected, dated cases; no regional welfare estimate, causal identification, audited net benefit or verified October 2026 operating status. The full 64-reference audit remains a later publication-wide gate.

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